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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAKU 001357

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KAREN HARBERT, DAS ALAN
HEGBURG, OFFICE OF RUSSIA/EURASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR LANA
EKIMOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [AJ](#)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV REVIEWS REGIONAL ISSUES WITH EUR
A/S FRIED

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E.Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: President Aliyev told A/S Fried that, although he was pleased with Azerbaijan's overall economic and social situation, he was concerned by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the potential for religious extremism in Azerbaijan. Aliyev believes that Ukraine's paralysis and Moldova's weakness are holding back GUAM; he affirmed that Azerbaijan would continue to be a staunch friend of Georgia in the face of increasing Russian provocations. While he was ready to offer Azerbaijan's infrastructure to assist Turkmenistan exporting energy west, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan would not take the lead in this project. A/S Fried said that Azerbaijan was an important ally of the U.S., and thanked President Aliyev for GOAJ's defusing the recent terrorist threat directed against the U.S. Embassy. He briefed President Aliyev on the recent Moscow 2-plus-2 talks, to include CFE, and missile defense, telling President Aliyev that the U.S. would "do nothing about Azerbaijan without Azerbaijan." END SUMMARY.

12. (C) On November 3, A/S Fried and the Ambassador had a two-hour meeting with President Ilham Aliyev, followed by a three-hour dinner (septel). Joining Aliyev in the meeting were FM Mammadyarov and Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov; only Mammadyarov joined the dinner. Deputy Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) also attended.

SECURITY COOPERATION

13. (C) A/S Fried thanked President Aliyev for the GOAJ's rapid and effective response to the recent terrorist threat against the U.S. Embassy. Aliyev said Azerbaijan's law enforcement authorities were very capable and would "protect us and our friends." Strong USG-GOAJ bilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism was important for the region and would continue. In this regard, Aliyev said that on November 2 Azerbaijan's security forces had arrested a "dangerous Arab terrorist" who had been on the run for a week to ten days (septel).

14. (C) Fried said that Azerbaijan was important to the U.S. and that a strong and independent Azerbaijan was both in Azerbaijan's and also America's interest. Aliyev thanked Fried for USG support, saying he valued the bilateral relationship, and agreed with Fried that it was important that the two countries coordinate in the region, where their

interests coincided.

ALIYEV TOUR D'HORIZON

¶15. (C) Aliyev said he was pleased with Azerbaijan's social and economic situation. The economy was performing well and the quality of life for Azerbaijanis was improving. Poverty was down from 49 percent when he took office to 20 percent, and will probably drop further to 15 percent next year. On unemployment, in the last four years he has created six hundred thousand jobs. Collected government revenues have also increased. In the last four years the government's budget has increased tenfold, from the equivalent of USD 1.4 billion dollars in 2003 to 12 billion in 2008, "more than the budget of Armenia and Georgia combined." His government is implementing sweeping infrastructure projects "everywhere," to include information technology, power, education, and transportation. He has built 1,200 schools in the last four years, and is equipping all schools with internet connections. Average salaries were increasing from 70-80 dollars a month to approximately 230 dollars monthly.

¶16. (C) The GOAJ has entered into "a gas partnership" with the EU, focused on the TGI and Nabucco pipelines. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) was increasing regional investments, to include a refinery in Ceyhan and other investments in the Romanian and Georgian energy sectors. Germany has also invited the GOAJ to invest in its energy sector. All of these countries rightfully see Azerbaijan as a friend.

¶17. (C) Aliyev said Azerbaijan's avoidance of Russian gas

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purchases last winter was an "historic" achievement, which "ruined Gazprom's monopoly." Azerbaijan's supplying gas to Turkey and Georgia (and soon Greece) was an "ideological and political victory." Azerbaijan offers a similar opportunity to escape Russian dominance to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, by offering them Azerbaijan's infrastructure as another venue for gas transport. The Azerbaijani and Kazakh governments have signed an intergovernmental agreement last summer, and this summer commercial entities from each country signed follow-on commercial agreements that will facilitate the shipment of Kazakh oil through Azerbaijan. Preliminary talks have also started with Turkmenistan on using Azerbaijani offshore infrastructure to move Turkmen gas westwards. Aliyev said that he and Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov have agreed that such cooperation could be called a "technical connection," vice a "trans-Caspian pipeline."

¶18. (C) Regionally, Aliyev said he was pleased with the GOAJ's relations with the EU and GUAM, with whom Azerbaijan is cooperating on energy issues. There are talks of Azerbaijan cooperating with Ukraine and Poland on a new pipeline to the Baltic Sea. Poland, Romania, and Lithuania had become "strong supporters of Azerbaijan," as had many countries in "old Europe."

¶19. (C) Azerbaijan "had made a deliberate choice to align itself with the European neighborhood, and was using its influence to contribute regionally and globally, to include helping in the Muslim world. Azerbaijan was moving toward prosperity, and lifting its citizens' lifestyles towards "European levels."

ALIYEV'S TWO CONCERNS

¶10. (C) Aliyev said that he had two major concerns: Nagorno-Karabakh and religious extremism. Concerning the latter, although the situation in Azerbaijan was currently satisfactory, the regional and Middle East situation was "not helpful" and if Azerbaijan were not careful, "it could have problems from both the north and the south." Recent episodes

in Azerbaijan were "a signal that we need to take measures."

¶11. (C) A/S Fried thanked Aliyev for his views, which by and large he shared. On the first of President Aliyev's two concerns (N-K), Armenian FM Oskanian has told Fried there has been progress on the "Paper of Principles." Fried had asked Oskanian whether he (Fried) could tell President Aliyev that Armenian President Kocharian was serious about resolving N-K. Oskanian told Fried that Kocharian was serious. Fried told Aliyev that although "Kocharian freezes up whenever an agreement is close," according to Oskanian he was ready to push forward. On Turkey, Turkish PM Erdogan, President Gul and FM Babajan all are seeking to "move towards the world" and make Turkey more active in global affairs, which is good for the GOAJ and USG. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan, and if there were progress in N-K, it would "unlock Turkey's ability to play a larger role, which would in turn give Azerbaijan more freedom of action." Turkey would also be much freer in its relations with Armenia which would strengthen Turkey's strategic importance and also help "kill the Armenian resolution" (HR 106) once and for all." If Armenia "comes out of its shell," it would be good for everyone in the region. The good news is that as far as N-K is concerned, Russia "is not acting as a spoiler."

¶12. (C) On President Aliyev's second major concern - religious extremism - Fried said that the short-term answer was focused on increased security cooperation, but that a longer-term solution could be found in following the Turkish model, where the AK party is the Turkic equivalent of the Christian Democratic Party. The AKP shows that an Islamic party can be modern, and as democracy develops in Turkey, so does the political space for Islam.

GOAJ-USG BILAT RELATIONS

¶13. (C) Fried said the U.S. has and will continue to support GOAJ efforts towards the Southern Corridor. The real progress on energy issues that Azerbaijan and the U.S. have

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made within the last year has increased Russian nervousness. In this regard, Russia's May agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to build a new gas pipeline, and Putin's comments at the recent Tehran Caspian summit, were signs of Russian nervousness, not confidence. Although it is strange that "America is more active than Europe" in supporting projects like Nabucco, another piece of good news within the last year was that Europe has "woken up" on the issue of energy security. Although in Germany the Social Democrats aren't worried about Russian energy dominance, "the European center" was moving toward the USG/GOAJ position on European energy security. On the eastern Caspian, Fried said that one of the USG's regional priorities was to support the "strategic freedom of choice" for countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, this policy being in no way "anti-Russian." He was heartened to hear that Aliyev and Nazarbayev were bolstering their cooperation, to include investing in Georgia. On Turkey, the situation was complicated by the PKK and by the recent Congressional resolution (HR 106) on "Armenian genocide." One bright spot in U.S.-Turkish relations was in energy cooperation, and in this regard he hoped that the GOT-GOAJ impasse on gas transit would be resolved.

GUAM - UKRAINE

¶14. (C) A/S Fried said that GUAM has great potential, but its success depends in part on a strong Ukraine. Unfortunately, Ukraine has been "weak and paralyzed" for over 18 months. He didn't care whether the government was "orange or orange-blue;" a strong and independent Ukrainian Government would be good not just for Ukraine and GUAM, but for the U.S. If Ukraine becomes a strong force within GUAM,

"then Moldova will follow." Aliyev said that Yushchenko "can't run a country with 15 percent support." However, Aliyev said that Yushchenko probably assumes that as long as there is no government he can remain president, whereas once a government is formed he becomes a lame duck. Fried repeated that the U.S. will support any democratically elected Ukrainian Government. Aliyev said that Yushchenko wanted "someone neutral" as head of the Ukrainian Government, but that this wouldn't happen. Fried said that Yushchenko's greatest tactical strength was shown in forcing early elections ("by breaking the law," President Aliyev interjected), but that now "the country is on hold, with no strategic direction." Aliyev said that when Yushchenko was elected he had tremendous support, but had "squandered it."

¶15. (C) In response to Fried's question as to whether Yushchenko's problems stemmed from poor health, Aliyev said that Yushchenko had told him he'd had health problems since being poisoned. Fried said he had hoped that Yushchenko would "spring forward" after having called for new elections, but it hadn't happened. He needs to build a genuine mandate. Ukraine's paralysis means that Russia can ignore the Balkans and pressure Georgia, whereas it could not ignore a strong Ukraine. Whereas chaos might tactically help Yushchenko, his popularity is declining.

¶16. (C) Aliyev agreed that Azerbaijan needed a strong Ukraine in GUAM and that a failed Ukraine "would leave a bad image in the world." Azerbaijan has tried to buttress GUAM by participating in various energy and transportation projects, to include the Odessa-Brody project, where Azerbaijan just took a share in the Sarmatia joint venture to fund a feasibility study on its expansion. However, in 2004 the Ukraine FM had been saying that "Azerbaijan doesn't have the oil" for Odessa-Brody, and now Azerbaijan needed to know Ukraine's position on this pipeline, since without Ukraine support the project wouldn't work. The GOAJ was also seeking political guarantees from the EU before going too far on Odessa-Brody.

GUAM - MOLDOVA

¶17. (C) President Aliyev said Moldova was "a problem." He expressed concern about Moldovan President Voronin, who was "not too stable" and who had "avoided" the two most recent GUAM summits, after which Moldovan wine was once again

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allowed into Russia. Aliyev thought Ukraine President Yushchenko "totally committed" to GUAM, but had real doubts about Voronin. Georgian President Saakashvili shared Aliyev's concerns. A/S Fried agreed with Aliyev's assessment, calling Voronin a "provincial communist" who is "terrified of Romania." Voronin doesn't see Moldova's future in Europe, but Azerbaijan needs to help convince Voronin that Moldova has a European future. Aliyev said that given Moldovans' ability to acquire Romanian citizenship, the joke was that Moldova would have a President and Parliament, but no people. Fried said that with Romania being a part of the EU, this desire for Romanian citizenship is quite logical.

GUAM - GEORGIA

¶18. (C) A/S Fried said that "Georgia and Azerbaijan can't be the only two pro-Western countries in the region." While most recently in Georgia he had spent much time with Saakashvili and had also met with the opposition. Fried told Saakashvili that Georgia's institutions were still weak and needed to be strengthened, as right now in Georgia "it is all Saakashvili." In this regard, it would be better if Saakashvili had better Parliamentary opposition. Aliyev agreed that "there was no one to replace" Saakashvili, although Parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze was a good person.

¶19. (C) Aliyev said Saakashvili has to endure "lots of provocations from Russia," which will only get worse. A/S Fried said Saakashvili needs a "steady friend who knows the neighborhood." The U.S. cannot always be such a friend, but Georgia was Azerbaijan's strategic partner, and Azerbaijan could be this friend. Aliyev agreed, saying Saakashvili always called him when he needed help, and that Azerbaijan "always helps Georgia," to include supplying weapons in 2004, gas last winter at vastly sub-market prices, and most recently with wheat when Saakashvili called him from Portugal about a wheat shortage. Russia was displeased with GOAJ support to Georgia, especially last winter's gas sales, but Aliyev said that "Russia has Armenia, we have Georgia." Although Saakashvili sometimes "talks stupidly," Aliyev said "he wouldn't do anything stupid." Fried said he had told Saakashvili that although Russia "feels itself invincible, time was on his side" in his relations with Russia, as the Georgian economy was improving yearly. Although Abkhazia is worse for Georgia than N-K was for Azerbaijan, he counseled Saakashvili not to let Russia "get to him." Aliyev said that whereas Azerbaijan's antagonist in the N-K confrontation was weak Armenia, Georgia's nemesis was a strong Russia.

¶20. (C) Fried said that Georgia had done an impressive job attracting foreign capital, and that "every time he visited Tbilisi, it looked better," Aliyev agreed, saying he had been in Tbilisi most recently in May, and that its progress was impressive. Fried said Saakashvili, like Aliyev, was popular, as both are "presidents during good times" and can draw on a reservoir of goodwill.

¶21. (C) Aliyev said that Kosovo was a serious problem for the region. He thinks Russia will recognize Abkhazia, especially if Kosovo is recognized unilaterally. If Russia recognizes Abkhazia, Saakashvili told Aliyev in Vilnius that Georgia would break diplomatic relations with Russia, and, with its strong army and military budget, would reclaim Abkhazia militarily. Aliyev told Fried that this chain of events could cause the region to "blow up," hence his worry about Kosovo.

¶22. (C) Aliyev said Russian FM Lavrov had told him in so many words in May that Russia was considering recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not N-K. A/S Fried agreed it was unlikely Russia would "cause trouble" in N-K. Despite Lavrov's comments, he himself didn't think that Russia would recognize Abkhazia: the USG has told Russia that its recognition of Abkhazia would be a major problem in bilateral relations, and Secretary Rice herself had warned Russian FM Lavrov so. If Russia were to recognize Abkhazia, the U.S. and Europe would respond so forcefully that it would "humiliate" Russia. Furthermore, Russia recognizing Abkhazia would be an aggressive move that would "re-open the 1991 Territorial Recognition Act," something the Russians would

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not want. Fried and Aliyev agreed that a Georgian military response to Russian Abkhazia recognition would be foolhardy, and Fried said he had warned Saakashvili against using the military option in Abkhazia. Fried had told Saakashvili that if Russia recognized Abkhazia, Georgia would "feel the world's support." In turn, Saakashvili had told A/S Fried on Kosovo that the U.S. shouldn't feel "frightened" by the Russians, but should go ahead and recognize Kosovo.

ENERGY

¶23. (C) Ambassador Derse mentioned that she would be going to Ashgabat for the November 14-15 Turkmenistan International Oil and Gas Exhibition (TIOGE) and would be meeting with senior GOTX officials, and asked how she could help advance bilateral GOTX-GOAJ energy cooperation. Aliyev said that the GOTX "must choose now" about its future and that the USG could help "push" it towards making the right decision. It is positive that Berdimuhamedov is talking with the

international community, but his strategy seems to be "saying yes to everyone," to include the U.S., Azerbaijan, China and Russia. The GOTX says it is ready to supply gas to Europe "at its border, but which border?" Azerbaijan cannot initiate GOTX energy sector outreach to Europe, nor act as if it needs Turkmen gas. Much as the USG "woke Europe up" as to where its interests lay and was the driving force behind the BTC and SCP pipelines, so it should help raise Turkmenistan's awareness of its strategic options.

In Tehran, Berdimuhamedov publicly called for a littoral agreement on Caspian energy use, but in a private talk with Aliyev said that their two countries need to build a trans-Caspian pipeline, which does not need the approval of any other littoral state. Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had over two trillion cubic meters of gas, and as such doesn't need to buy any gas from Turkmenistan. However, it was willing to provide its infrastructure to Turkmenistan in furtherance of the Southern Corridor Project.

¶24. (C) Aliyev said that in Tehran he had talked with Kazakh President Nazarbayev about similar energy cooperation, with Nazarbayev once again suggesting a trilateral heads of state meeting with Turkmenistan. Aliyev approved of the idea and said Azerbaijan would support it, suggesting that Nazarbayev organize and host such a summit, although Aliyev doesn't think that Nazarbayev would follow through.

¶25. (C) In Tehran, Nazarbayev also told him that each Caspian country should be free to pursue its own projects, as opposed to Putin's position that due to environmental reasons all five littoral states must approve of Caspian energy projects. Aliyev said he had told Putin that since 1949, thousands of kilometers of underwater pipeline had been laid in the Caspian without any problems. Putin then said the problem in the Caspian had to do with "underground mountains," at which point Aliyev called over octogenarian SOCAR First VP for Geology, Geophysics and Field Development Khoshbakht Yusifzade, who told Putin that he had been working in the Caspian longer than Putin had been alive, and that he (Putin) was wrong. Putin then conceded, Aliyev said, that bilateral energy project development was "not a problem in principle," although Aliyev said that Putin will doubtless act differently.

¶26. (C) Aliyev said that if Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were to join up with Azerbaijan in Caspian energy development, it could "change the geopolitics of the region." A/S Fried agreed, saying that for this reason Russia was desperate to stop Kazakh and Turkmen cooperation with Azerbaijan and the West. If Russia were unable to "lockdown" Caspian gas, "their plans fail, and they would have to reform Gazprom." As such, Russia is "leaning on" Nazarbayev and Berdimuhamedov. Nazarbayev can handle Russian pressure, although it is not clear that he is strategically committed to moving westward. Turkmenistan however will need GOAJ help in resisting Russia. The GOTX is "completely at sea" as to how to operate regionally and globally, which is why it is "saying yes to everything." Azerbaijan, with its seasoned and experienced diplomats and officials, can help Turkmen officials in this learning process.

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¶27. (C) Aliyev said that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were both telling Russia that Azerbaijan was the one seeking to draw their energy westwards, so as to deflect Russian anger away from them. However, "Azerbaijan can handle Russia's anger," as "they have nothing on us" - they tried to pressure Azerbaijan with gas, it didn't work. They next tried to pressure Azerbaijan by expelling Azerbaijani nationals from Russia, but that too was unsuccessful. However, neither Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan has Azerbaijan's strength of will to resist Russia. Azerbaijan should be an example for these countries, for if they just "take one step into the Caspian," Azerbaijan can do the rest.

¶28. (C) A/S Fried said that the U.S. needs to help "handle the public side" of the Caspian energy issue and help dispel the myth that "Russia has won" in the battle for Caspian energy, while neutralizing additional Russian pressure on Azerbaijan. Russia is seeking to create the impression that it has secured Caspian energy for itself, but Europe needs to know the truth that this is not the case. European energy companies know the truth, but they are remaining quiet. In Western Europe some think that "we should just accept" Russian energy dominance, although the situation has improved since the time of German Chancellor Schroeder. It is a U.S. (vice Azerbaijani) challenge, but Aliyev should be aware of this "perception management problem," where Russia is trying to "dominate the information space."

¶29. (C) Aliyev said in this regard he always seeks to comment publicly on Azerbaijan's energy potential and production. Azerbaijan will produce 15-16 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas next year, and is working to develop a new field. It is moving toward producing 25-30 bcm/a, which could help in supplying Europe's energy needs. Azerbaijan also participates in regional energy-focused events, to include his own participation in the Vilnius and Krakow summits this year, where he highlighted GOAJ energy production. In this regard, his actions and those of the U.S. have helped turn around Hungary's perceptions about Azerbaijan energy. A/S Fried agreed, saying he had "spent 90 minutes with Prime Minister Gyurcsany, 90 percent of which was about energy," in the attempt to convince him that he had options.

¶30. (C) Aliyev said that SOCAR had also recently opened up a regional office in Romania, to help its energy outreach downstream. Fried said that USG-GOAJ energy interests coincide, and the two countries will continue to work closely together. DAS Bryza has done a great job in this regard, and others in the USG are also ready to help. He told President Aliyev that his standing offer was that if Azerbaijan needed help on any matter, "just let us know."

MOSCOW 2-PLUS-2 TALKS

¶31. (C) Prefacing his comments by saying that the USG always sought to keep its friends informed, A/S Fried assured President Aliyev that the USG would do nothing with Russia on Azerbaijan without first consulting with Azerbaijan: "we will do nothing about you without you." As such, A/S Fried said he would like to brief the President on the "strategic basket of issues" of nuclear issues, arms control, CFE and missile defense they had discussed in Moscow during the 2-plus-2 talks. Fried said the USG was looking for areas to cooperate with Russia where their interests overlap, given their disagreements on many issues, to include Kosovo, energy and Iran. Finding such areas of cooperation would help stabilize the relationship during the upcoming transitional periods in the two countries, given the upcoming U.S. presidential election and the "from Putin to Putin" transition in Russia.

CFE

¶32. (C) A/S Fried said that Russia was interested in "oing past the block" concerning Istanbul commitments. Georgia and Moldova want to be helpful. Russia is trying to decide whether to suspend CFE and then negotiate, or to seek a deal now, with some EU pressure on Russia not to suspend. The USG offer was a good one that showed some flexibility. Russia

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was seeking to lower national and territorial ceilings for NATO countries. Russia had demanded that the U.S. commit to abolishing flank limits for Russia, saying that the U.S. could do the same for itself. Fried said the U.S. refused this offer, and that Secretary Rice had instructed him that while he has negotiating flexibility on other issues, there

was "no flexibility" on this issue. Fried told Aliyev that given Azerbaijan's interest in revised national and territorial ceilings he would be interested to know that the U.S. had put forward a counter-offer to Russia of a multilateral discussion of flanks and also national and territorial ceilings. The U.S. proposal stipulated that these discussions would begin after the adopted treaty went into effect. In sum, A/S Fried said that the CFE situation was "better in private than it appeared in public." He was scheduled to meet his Russian counterpart on November 7, at which point he would have a better idea of the Russian response. He suspected there would be movement on this issue from the Russian Foreign Minister on the margins of the upcoming OSCE conference in Madrid.

MISSILE DEFENSE

¶33. (C) Aliyev thanked Fried for the information, jokingly adding that it seemed the only areas where Russia and the U.S. cooperated, i.e. N-K and anti-missile defense, related to Azerbaijan. He said that the GOAJ had true military cooperation with the U.S., but made only limited military purchases from Russia. When he talked with Putin two years ago about the Gabala radar station, Putin said he planned to shut it down when the current lease ended. Aliyev said that the GOAJ had no reason to prolong the agreement, since it hadn't been a good deal for Azerbaijan when it was signed in ¶2000. But evidently the Russian thinking on Gabala has changed. There was a provision in the original agreement that Russia could not make any changes in Gabala without GOAJ agreement, which was why Putin had called Aliyev before pitching U.S.-Russian cooperation at the site.

¶34. (C) A/S Fried said that if the Russians were serious about the Gabala offer, there would be other U.S.-GOAJ bilateral questions that would need to be discussed, to include the possibility of Azerbaijan coming under increased Iranian pressure. By definition, "if Russia gets serious on missile defense, it means an increase in U.S.-GOAJ security cooperation...we would undertake certain responsibilities vis a vis Azerbaijan." It is a statement of the obvious, not an obligation, to say that if Gabala were part of an early-warning system protecting Europe, Russia and the U.S., then Azerbaijan would be part of the missile defense system. A/S Fried said that if it worked out, it would mean that Azerbaijan would have a military connection with NATO. He said the U.S. would "wait to see what Russia does" regarding Gabala, which does have "real capabilities." Europe was still undecided about missile defense, although the situation was better than it was six months ago. President Aliyev said it would be good for Azerbaijan to be part of this global defense system. Concerning Iran, he said Azerbaijan was already feeling increased pressure due to the Gabala offer, but he had told Ahmadinejad that he should be bothering Putin, as U.S.-Russian cooperation on Gabala was Putin's idea.

¶35. (C) A/S Fried referred to the Train and Equip (TEP) program in Georgia, saying it had been a great success, giving discipline to the Georgian military. If Azerbaijan were to consider increasing its forces in Afghanistan to battalion-size, Fried and Aliyev agreed that a similar program could be considered for Azerbaijan.

¶36. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Fried.
DERSE